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Abstract. The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major
components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorpo-
rate new pieces of information. We introduced the Horn knowledge base
dynamics to deal with two important points: first, to handle belief states
that need not be deductively closed; and the second point is the ability
to declare certain parts of the belief as immutable. In this paper, we
address another, radically new approach to this problem. This approach
is very close to the Hansson’s dyadic representation of belief. Here, we
consider the immutable part as defining a new logical system. By a log-
ical system, we mean that it defines its own consequence relation and
closure operator. Based on this, we provide an abductive framework for
Horn knowledge base dynamics.
Keyword: AGM, Immutable, Integrity Constraint, Knowledge Base Dy-
namics, Abduction.
1 Introduction
Over the last three decades [15], abduction has been embraced in AI as a non-
monotonic reasoning paradigm to address some of the limitations of deductive
reasoning in classical logic. The role of abduction has been demonstrated in a
variety of applications. It has been proposed as a reasoning paradigm in AI for
diagnosis, natural language understanding, default reasoning, planning, knowl-
edge assimilation and belief revision, multi-agent systems and other problems
(see [47]).
In the concept of knowledge assimilation and belief revision (see [38]), when a
new item of information is added to a knowledge base, inconsistency can result.
Revision means modifying the Horn knowledge base in order to maintain con-
sistency, while keeping the new information and removing (contraction) or not
removing the least possible previous information. In our case, update means revi-
sion and contraction, that is insertion and deletion in database perspective. Our
previous work [10,11] makes connections with contraction from Horn knowledge
base dynamics.
Our Horn knowledge base dynamics is defined in two parts: an immutable
part (formulae or sentences) and updatable part (literals) (for definition and
properties see works of Nebel [35] and Segerberg [48]). Horn knowledge bases
have a set of integrity constraints (see the definitions in later section). In the
case of finite Horn knowledge bases, it is sometimes hard to see how the update
relations should be modified to accomplish certain knowledge base updates.
Example 1. Consider a database with an (immutable) rule that a staff member
is a person who is currently working in a research group under a chair. Addi-
tional (updatable) facts are that matthias and gerhard are group chairs, and
delhibabu and aravindan are staff members in group info1. Our first integrity
constraint (IC) is that each research group has only one chair ie. ∀x, y, z (y=z)←
group chair(x,y) ∧ group chair(x,z). Second integrity constraint is that a person
can be a chair for only one research group ie. ∀x, y, z (y=z)← group chair(y,x)
∧ group chair(z,x).
Immutable part: staff chair(X,Y)← staff group(X,Z),group chair(Z,Y).
Updatable part: group chair(infor1,matthias)←
group chair(infor2,gerhard)←
staff group(delhibabu,infor1)←
staff group(aravindan,infor1)←
Suppose we want to update this database with the information, staff chair(delhiba-
bu,aravindan), that is
staff chair(delhibabu,aravindan)← staff group(delhibabu,Z)
∧
group chair(Z,aravindan)
If we are restricted to definite clauses, there is only one plausible way to do
this: delhibabu and aravindan belong to groups infor1, this updating means that
we need to delete (remove) matthias from the database and newly add (insert)
aravindan to the database (aravindan got promoted to the chair of the research
group infor1 and he was removed from research group infor1). This results in an
update that is too strong. If we allow disjunctive information into the database,
however, we can accomplish the update by minimal adding wrt consistency
staff group(delhibabu,infor1) ∨ group chair(infor1,aravindan)
and this option appears intuitively to be correct.
When adding new beliefs to the Horn knowledge base, if the new belief is
violating integrity constraints then belief revision needs to be performed, other-
wise, it is simply added. As we will see, in these cases abduction can be used in
order to compute all the possibilities and it is not up to user or system to choose
among them.
When dealing with the revision of a Horn knowledge base (both insertions
and deletions), there are other ways to change a Horn knowledge base and it
has to be performed automatically also. Considering the information, change is
precious and must be preserved as much as possible. The principle of minimal
change [21,46] can provide a reasonable strategy. On the other hand, practical
implementations have to handle contradictory, uncertain, or imprecise informa-
tion, so several problems can arise: how to define efficient change in the style of
AGM [1]; what result has to be chosen [25,29,33]; and finally, according to a prac-
tical point of view, what computational model to support for Horn knowledge
base revision has to be provided?
Since Horn knowledge base change is one of the main problems arising in
knowledge representation, it has been tackled according to several points of view.
In this article, we consider the immutable part as defining a new logical system.
By a logical system, we mean that it defines its own consequence relation and
closure operator. Based on this, we provide an abductive framework for belief
dynamics (see [3,8,50]).
The rest of paper is organized as follows: First we start with preliminaries
along with the concept of logical system and properties of consequences operator.
In Section 3, we introduce Horn knowledge base dynamics with our logical sys-
tem. In Section 4, we explore the relationship of Horn knowledge base dynamics
with coherence approach. In Section 5, we present how Horn knowledge base dy-
namics can be realized using abductive explanations. In Section 6, we give brief
overview of related works. In Section 7, we make conclusions with a summary of
our contribution as well as a discussion of future directions of investigation.
2 Preliminaries
A first order language consists of an alphabet A of a language L. We assume a
countable universe of variables Var, ranged over x,y,z, and a countable universe
of relation (i.e predicate) symbols, ranged over by A. The following grammar
defines FOL, the language of first order logic with equality and binary relations:
ϕ ::= x = x | a(x, x) | ¬ϕ |
∨
φ |
∧
φ | ∃X : φ.
Here φ ⊆ FOL and X ⊆ V ar are finite sets of formulae and variables,
respectively.
Definition 1 (Normal Logic Program [22]). By an alphabet A of a language
L we mean disjoint sets of constants, predicate symbols, and function symbols,
with at least one constant. In addition, any alphabet is assumed to contain a
countably infinite set of distinguished variable symbols. A term over A is de-
fined recursively as either a variable, a constant or an expression of the form
f(t1, ..., tn) where f is a function symbol of A, n its arity, and the ti are terms.
An atom over A is an expression of the form P (t1, ..., tn) where P is a pred-
icate symbol of A and the ti are terms. A literal is either an atom A or its
default negation not A. We dub default literals those of the form not A. A term
(resp. atom, literal) is said ground if it does not contain variables. The set of all
ground terms (resp. atoms) of A is called the Herbrand universe (resp. base) of
A. A Normal Logic Program is a possibly infinite set of rules (with no infinite
descending chains of syntactical dependency) of the form:
H ← B1, ..., Bn, not C1, ..., not Cm, (with m, n ≥ 0 and finit)
Where H, the Bi and the Cj are atoms, and each rule stands for all its ground
instances. In conformity with the standard convention, we write rules of the form
H ← also simply as H (known as fact). An NLP P is called definite if none of
its rules contain default literals. H is the head of the rule r, denoted by head(r),
and body(r) denotes the set {B1, ..., Bn, not C1, ..., not Cm} of all the literals in
the body of r.
When doing problem modeling with logic programs, rules of the form
⊥ ← B1, ..., Bn, not C1, ..., not Cm, (with m, n ≥ 0 and finit)
with a non-empty body are known as a type of integrity constraints (ICs),
specifically denials, and they are normally used to prune out unwanted can-
didate solutions. We abuse the not default negation notation applying it to
non-empty sets of literals too: we write not S to denote {not s : s ∈ S}, and
confound not not a ≡ a. When S is an arbitrary, non-empty set of literals
S = {B1, ..., Bn, not C1, ..., not Cm} we use:
- S+ denotes the set {B1, . . . , Bn} of positive literals in S .
- S− denotes the set {not C1, . . . , not Cm} of negative literals in S .
- |S| = S+ ∪ (not S−) denotes the set {B1, . . . , Bn, C1, . . . , Cm} of atoms of
S.
As expected, we say a set of literals S is consistent iff S+ ∩ |S−| = ∅. We
also write heads(P ) to denote the set of heads of non-IC rules of a (possibly
constrained) program P , i.e., heads(P ) = {head(r) : r ∈ P}\{⊥}, and facts(P )
to denote the set of facts of P - facts(P ) = {head(r) : r ∈ P ∧ body(r) = ∅}.
Definition 2 (Level mapping[4]). Let P be a normal logic program and BP
its Herbrand base. A level mapping for P is a function ‖: BP → N of ground
atoms to natural numbers. The mapping ‖ is also extended to ground literals by
assigning | ¬A | = | A | for all ground atoms A ∈ BP . For every literal ground
L, | L | is called as the level of L in P.
Definition 3 (Acyclic program [4]). Let P be a normal logic program and ‖
a level mapping for P. P is called as acyclic with respect to ‖ if for every ground
clause H ← L1, ..., Ln (with n ≥ 0 and finit) in P the level of A is higher then
the level of every Li (1 ≤i≤ n). Moreover P is called acyclic if P is acyclic with
respect to some level mapping for P.
Unlike Horn knowledge base dynamics, where knowledge is defined as a set
of sentences, here we wish to define a Horn knowledge base KB wrt a language
L, as an abductive framework < P,Ab, IC,K >, where,
* P is an acyclic normal logic program with all abducibles in P at level 0
and no non-abducible at level 0. P is referred to as a logical system. This
in conjunction with the integrity constraints corresponds to immutable part
of the Horn knowledge base, here P is defined by immutable part. This is
discussed further in the next subsection;
* Ab is a set of atoms from L, called the abducibles. This notion is required in
an abductive framework, and this corresponds to the atoms that may appear
in the updatable part of the knowledge;
* IC is the set of integrity constraints, a set of sentences from language L.
This specifies the integrity of a Horn knowledge base and forms a part of the
knowledge that can not be modified over time;
* K is a set of sentences from L. It is the current knowledge, and the only part
of KB that changes over time. This corresponds to the updatable part of
the Horn knowledge base. The main requirement here is that no sentence in
K can have an atom that does not appear in Ab.
2.1 Logical system
The main idea of our approach is to consider the immutable part of the knowledge
to define a new logical system. By a logical system, we mean that P defines
its own consequence relation |=P and its closure Cnp. Given P , we have the
Herbrand Base HBP and GP , the ground instantiation of P .
An abductive interpretation I is a set of abducibles, i.e. I ⊆ Ab. How I
interprets all the ground atoms of L 1 is defined, inductively on the level of
atoms wrt P , as follows:
* An atom A at level 0 (note that only abducibles are at level 0) is interpreted
as: A is true in I iff A ∈ I, else it is false in I.
* An atom A at level n is interpreted as: A is true in I iff ∃ clause A ←
L1, . . . , Lk in GP s.t. ∀Lj (1 ≤ j ≤ k) if Lj is an atom then Lj is true in I,
else if Lj is a negative literal ¬Bj , then Bj is false in I.
This interpretation of ground atoms can be extended, in the usual way, to
interpret sentences in L, as follows (where α and β are sentences):
* ¬α is true in I iff α is false in I.
* α ∧ β is true in I iff both α and β are true in I.
* α ∨ β is true in I iff either α is true in I or β is true in I.
* ∀α is true in I iff all ground instantiations of α are true in I.
* ∃α is true in I iff some ground instantiation of α is true in I.
Given a sentence α in L, an abductive interpretation I is said to be an
abductive model of α iff α is true in I. Extending this to a set of sentences K, I
is a abductive model of K iff I is an abductive model of every sentence α in K.
Given a set of sentences K and a sentence α, α is said to be a P -consequence
of K, written as K |=P α, iff every abductive model of K is an abductive model
of α also. Putting it in other words, letMod(K) be the set of all abductive models
of K. Then α is a P -consequence of K iff α is true in all abductive interpreta-
tions in Mod(K). The consequence operator CnP is then defined as CnP (K) =
1 the set of all the ground atoms of L, in fact depends of L, and is given as HBP , the
Herbrand Base of P
{α | K |=P α} = {α | α is true in all abductive interpretations in Mod(K)}.
K is said to be P-consistent iff there is no expression α s.t. α ∈ CnP (K) and
¬α ∈ CnP (K). Two sentences α and β are said to be P -equivalent to each
other, written as α ≡ β, iff they have the same set of abductive models , i.e.
Mod(α) =Mod(β).
2.2 Properties of consequences operator
Since a new consequence operator is defined, it is reasonable, to ask whether it
satisfies certain properties that are required in the Horn knowledge base dynam-
ics context. Here, we observe that all the required properties, listed by various
researchers in Horn knowledge base dynamics, are satisfied by the defined con-
sequence operator. The following propositions follow from the above definitions,
and can be verified easily.
CnP satisfies inclusion, i.e. K ⊆ CnP (K).
CnP satisfies iteration, i.e. CnP (K) = CnP (CnP (K)).
Anther interesting property is monotony, i.e. if K ⊆ K ′, then CnP (K) ⊆
CnP (K
′). CnP satisfies monotony. To see this, first observe that Mod(K
′) ⊆
Mod(K).
CnP satisfies superclassicality , i.e. if α can be derived from K by first order
classical logic, then α ∈ CnP (K).
CnP satisfies deduction , i.e. if β ∈ CnP (K ∪ {α}), then (β ← α) ∈ Cn(K).
CnP satisfies compactness , i.e. if α ∈ CnP (K), then α ∈ CnP (K ′) for some
finite subset K ′ of K.
2.3 Statics of a Horn knowledge base
The statics of a Horn knowledge base KB, is given by the current knowledge K
and the integrity constraints IC. An abductive interpretationM is an abductive
model of KB iff it is an abductive model of K ∪IC. LetMod(KB) be the set of
all abductive models of KB. The belief set represented by KB, written as KB•
is given as,
KB• = CnP (K ∪ IC) = {α|α is true in every abductive model of KB}.
A belief (represented by a sentence in L) α is accepted in KB iff α ∈ KB|bullet
(i.e. α is true in every model of KB). α is rejected in KB iff ¬α ∈ KB• (i.e. α
is false in every model of KB). Note that there may exist a sentence α s.t. α is
neither accepted nor rejected in KB (i.e. α is true in some but not all models of
KB), and so KB represents a partial description of the world.
Two Horn knowledge bases KB1 and KB2 are said to be equivalent to each
other, written as KB1 ≡ KB2, iff they are based on the same logical system and
their current knowledge are P -equivalent, i.e. P1 = P2, Ab1 = Ab2, IC1 = IC2
and K1 ≡ K2. Obviously, two equivalent Horn knowledge bases KB1 and KB2
represent the same belief set, i.e. KB•1 = KB
•
2 .
3 Horn knowledge base dynamics
In AGM [1] three kinds of belief dynamics are defined: expansion, contraction
and revision. We consider all of them, one by one, in the sequel.
3.1 Expansion
Let α be new information that has to be added to a knowledge baseKB. Suppose
¬α is not accepted in KB. Then, obviously α is P - consistent with IC, and
KB can be expanded by α, by modifying K as follows:
KB + α ≡< P,Ab, IC,K ∪ {α} >
Note that we do not force the presence of α in the new K, but only say that α
must be in the belief set represented by the expanded Horn knowledge base. If
in case ¬α is accepted in KB (in other words, α is inconsistent with IC), then
expansion of KB by α results in a inconsistent Horn knowledge base with no
abductive models, i.e. (KB + α)• is the set of all sentences in L.
Putting it in model-theoretic terms, KB can be expanded by a sentence α,
when α is not false in all models of KB. The expansion is defined as:
Mod(KB + α) =Mod(KB) ∩Mod(α).
If α is false in all models ofKB, then clearlyMod(KB+α) is empty, implying
that expanded Horn knowledge base is inconsistent.
3.2 Revision
As usual, for revising and contracting a Horn knowledge base, the rationality of
the change is discussed first. Later a construction is provided that complies with
the proposed rationality postulates.
Rationality postulates
Let KB =< P,Ab, IC,K > be revised by a sentence α to result in a new
Horn knowledge base KB ∔ α =< P ′, Ab′, IC′,K ′ >.
When a Horn knowledge base is revised, we do not (generally) wish to modify
the underlying logical system P or the set of abducibles Ab. This is refereed to
as inferential constancy by Hansson [19,20].
(∔1) (Inferential constancy) P ′ = P and Ab′ = Ab,IC′ = IC.
(∔2) (Success)α is accepted in KB ∔ α , i.e. α is true in all models of KB ∔ α.
(∔3) (Consistency) α is satisfiable and P -consistent with IC iff KB ∔ α is P-
consistent, i.e. Mod({α} ∪ IC) is not empty iff Mod(KB ∔ α) is not empty.
(∔4) (Vacuity) If ¬α is not accepted in KB, then KB ∔ α ≡ KB + α, i.e. if α is
not false in all models of KB, then Mod(KB ∔ α) =Mod(KB) ∩Mod(α).
(∔5) (Preservation)If KB ≡ KB′ and α ≡ β, then KB ∔ α ≡ KB′ ∔ β, i.e. if
Mod(KB) = Mod(KB′) and Mod(α) = Mod(β), then Mod(KB ∔ α) =
Mod(KB ∔ β).
(∔6) (Extended Vacuity 1)(KB ∔ α) + β implies KB ∔ (α ∧ β), i.e. (Mod(KB ∔
α) ∩Mod(β)) ⊆Mod(KB ∔ (α ∧ β)).
(∔7) (Extended Vacuity 2)If ¬β is not accepted in (KB ∔ α), then KB ∔ (α ∧ β)
implies (KB ∔ α) + β, i.e. if β is not false in all models of KB ∔ α, then
Mod(KB ∔ (α ∧ β)) ⊆ (Mod(KB ∔ α) ∩Mod(β)).
Construction
Let S stand for the set of all abductive interpretations that are consistent with
IC, i.e. S = Mod(IC). We do not consider abductive interpretations that are
not models of IC, simply because IC does not change during revision. Observe
that when IC is empty, S is the set of all abductive interpretations. Given a Horn
knowledge base KB, and two abductive interpretations I1 and I2 from S, we
can compare how close these interpretations are to KB by using an order ≤KB
among abductive interpretations in S. I1 <KB I2 iff I1 ≤KB I2 and I2 KB I1.
Let F ⊆ S. An abductive interpretation I ∈ F is minimal in F wrt ≤KB if
there is no I ′ ∈ F s.t. I ′ <KB I. Let, Min(F ,≤KB) = {I | I is minimal in
F wrt ≤KB}.
For any Horn knowledge base KB, the following are desired properties of
≤KB:
(≤ 1) (Pre-order)≤KB is a pre-order , i.e. it is transitive and reflexive.
(≤ 2) (Connectivity)≤KB is total in S, i.e. ∀I1, I2 ∈ S: either I1 ≤KB I2 or I2 ≤KB
I1.
(≤ 3) (Faithfulness)≤KB is faithful to KB, i.e. I ∈Min(S,≤KB) iff I ∈Mod(KB).
(≤ 4) (Minimality)For any non-empty subset F of S, Min(F ,≤KB) is not empty.
(≤ 5) (Preservance)] For any Horn knowledge base KB’, if KB ≡ KB′ then
≤KB=≤KB′.
Let KB (and consequently K) be revised by a sentence α, and ≤KB be a
rational order that satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). Then the abductive models of the
revised Horn knowledge base are given precisely by:Min(Mod({α}∪IC),≤KB).
Note that, this construction does not say what the resulting K is, but merely
says what should be the abductive models of the new Horn knowledge base.
Representation theorem
Now, we proceed to show that revision of KB by α, as constructed above,
satisfies all the rationality postulates stipulated in the beginning of this section.
This is formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base, ≤KB an order among S that
satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). Let a revision operator ∔ be defined as: for any sen-
tence α, Mod(KB ∔ α) =Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB). Then ∔ satisfies all the
rationality postulates for revision (∔1) to (∔7).
Proof.
(∔1) P ′ = P and Ab′ = Ab and IC′ = IC
This is satisfied obviously, since our construction does not touch P and Ab,
and IC follows from every abductive interpretation in Mod(KB ∔ α).
(∔2) α is accepted in KB ∔ α
Note that every abductive interpretation M ∈ Mod(KB + α) is a model of
α. Hence α is accepted in KB ∔ α.
(∔3) α is satisfiable and P -consistent with IC iff KB ∔ α is P -consistent.
If part: If KB ∔ α is P -consistent , then Mod(KB ∔ α) is not empty. This
implies that Mod({α} ∪ IC) is not empty, and hence α is satisfiable and
P -consistent with IC.
Only if part: If α is satisfiable and P-consistent with IC, thenMod({α}∪IC)
is not empty, and (≤ 4) ensures that Mod(KB ∔ α) is not empty. Thus,
KB ∔ α is P -consistent.
(∔4) If ¬α is not accepted in KB, then KB ∔ α ≡ KB + α.
We have to establish thatMin(Mod({α}∪IC),≤KB) =Mod(KB)∩Mod(α).
Since ¬α is not accepted in KB, Mod(KB)∩Mod(α) is not empty. The re-
quired result follows immediately from the fact that ≤KB is faithful to KB
(i.e. satisfies ≤ 3), which selects only and all those models of α which are
also models of KB.
(∔5) If KB ≡ KB′ and α ≡ β then KB ∔ α = KB′ ∔ β
(≤ 5) ensures that ≤KB=≤KB′. The required result follows immediately from
this and the fact that Mod(α) =Mod(β).
(∔6) (KB ∔ α) + β implies KB ∔ (α ∧ β).
We consider this in two cases. When ¬β is accepted in KB∔α, (KB∔α)+β
is the set of all sentences from L, and the postulate follows immediately.
Instead when ¬β is not accepted in KB ∔ α, this postulates coincides with
the next one.
(∔7) If ¬β is not accepted in KB ∔ α, then KB ∔ (α ∧ β) implies (KB ∔ α) + β.
Together with the second case of previous postulate, we need to show that
KB ∔ (α ∧ β) = (KB ∔ α) + β. In other words, we have to establish that
Min(Mod({α ∧ β} ∪ IC),≤KB) = Mod(KB ∔ α) ∩Mod(β). For the sake
of simplicity, let us represent Min(Mod({α ∧ β} ∪ IC),≤KB) by P, and
Mod(KB ∔ α) ∩Mod(β), which is the same as Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB
) ∩Mod(β), by Q. The required result is obtained in two parts:
1) ∀ (abductive interpretation)M: if M ∈ P , then M ∈ Q
Obviously M ∈Mod(β). Assume that M <Min(Mod({α}∪ IC),≤KB).
This can happen in two cases, and we show that both the cases lead to
contradiction.
Case A: No model of β is selected by ≤KB from Mod({α} ∪ IC). But
this contradicts our initial condition that ¬β is not accepted in KB ∔α.
Case B: Some model, say M ′, of β is selected by ≤KB from Mod({α} ∪
IC). Since M is not selected, it follows that M ′ <KB M . But then this
contradicts our initial assumption that M ∈ P . So, P ⊆ Q.
2) ∀ (abductive interpretation)M: if M ∈ Q, then M ∈ P
M ∈ Q implies that M is a model of both α and β, and M is selected by
≤KB from Mod({α}∪ IC). Note that Mod({α∧β}∪ IC) ⊆Mod({α}∪
IC). Since M is selected by ≤KB in a bigger set (i.e. Mod({α} ∪ IC)),
≤KB must select M from its subset Mod({α ∧ β} ∪ IC) also. Hence
Q ⊆ P . 
But, that is not all. Any rational revision of KB by α, that satisfies all the
rationality postulates, can be constructed by our construction method, and this
is formalized below.
Lemma 2. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base and ∔ a revision operator that
satisfies all the rationality postulates for revision (∔1) to (∔7). Then, there exists
an order ≤KB among S, that satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5), and for any sentence α,
Mod(KB ∔ α) is given in Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB).
Proof. Let us construct an order ≤KB among interpretations in S as follows:
For any two abductive interpretations I and I ′ in S, define I ≤KB I
′ iff either
I ∈ Mod(KB) or I ∈ Mod(KB ∔ form(I, I ′)), where form(I, I ′) stands for
sentence whose only models are I and I ′. We will show that ≤KB thus constructed
satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5) and Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB) =Mod(KB ∔ α).
First, we show that Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB) = Mod(KB ∔ α).Suppose
α is not satisfiable, i.e. Mod(α) is empty, or α does not satisfy IC, then there
are no abductive models of {α} ∪ IC, and hence Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB)
is empty. From (∔3), we infer that Mod(KB ∔ α) is also empty. When α is
satisfiable and α satisfies IC, the required result is obtained in two parts:
1) If I ∈Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB), then I ∈Mod(KB ∔ α)
Since α is satisfiable and consistent with IC, (∔3) implies that there exists at
least one model, say I ′, for KB∔α. From (∔1), it is clear that I ′ is a model of
IC, from (∔2) we also get that I ′ is a model of α, and consequently I ≤KB I ′
(because I ∈ Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB)). Suppose I ∈ Mod(KB), then
(∔4) immediately gives I ∈ Mod(KB ∔ α). If not, from our definition of
≤KB, it is clear that I ∈Mod(KB∔form(I, I
′)). Note that α∧form(I, I ′) ≡
form(I, I ′), since both I and I ′ are models of α. From (∔6) and (∔7), we
get Mod(KB∔α)∩{I, I ′} =Mod(KB∔form(I, I ′)). Since I ∈Mod(KB∔
form(I, I ′)), it immediately follows that I ∈Mod(KB ∔ α).
2) If I ∈Mod(KB ∔ α), then I ∈Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB).
From (∔1) we get I is a model of IC, and from (∔2), we obtain I ∈Mod(α).
Suppose I ∈ Mod(KB), then from our definition of ≤KB, we get I ≤KB
I ′, for any other model I ′ of α and IC, and hence I ∈ Min(Mod({α} ∪
IC),≤KB). Instead, if I is not a model of KB, then, to get the required
result, we should show that I ∈Mod(KB ∔ form(I, I ′)), for every model I ′
of α and IC. As we have observed previously, from (∔6) and (∔7), we get
Mod(KB∔α)∩{I, I ′} =Mod(KB∔form(I, I ′)). Since I ∈Mod(KB∔α),
it immediately follows that I ∈Mod(KB∔form(I, I ′)). Hence I ≤KB I ′ for
any model I ′ of α and IC, and consequently, I ∈Min(Mod({α}∪IC),≤KB
).
Now we proceed to show that the order ≤KB among S, constructed as per
our definition, satisfies all the rationality axioms (≤ 1) to (≤ 5).
(≤ 1) ≤KB is a pre-order.
Note that we need to consider only abductive interpretations from S. From
(∔2) and (∔3), we have Mod(KB ∔ form(I, I ′)) = {I}, and so I ≤KB
I. Thus ≤KB satisfies reflexivity. let I1 ∈ Mod(IC) and I2 < Mod(IC).
Clearly, it is possible that two interpretations I1 and I2 are not models of
KB, and Mod(KB ∔ form(I1, I2)) = {I1}. So, I1 ≤KB I2 does not neces-
sarily imply I2 ≤KB I1, and thus ≤KB satisfies anti-symmetry.
To show the transitivity, we have to prove that I1 ≤KB I3, when I1 ≤KB I2
and I2 ≤KB I3 hold. Suppose I1 ∈Mod(KB), then I1 ≤KB I3 follows imme-
diately from our definition of ≤KB. On the other case, when I1 <Mod(KB),
we first observe that I1 ∈Mod(KB∔ form(I1, I2)), which follows from defi-
nition of ≤KB and I1 ≤KB I2. Also observe that I2 <Mod(KB). If I2 were
a model of KB, then it follows from (∔4) that Mod(KB ∔ form(I1, I2)) =
Mod(KB)∩{I1, I2} = {I2}, which is a contradiction, and so I2 <Mod(KB).
This, together with I2 ≤KB I3, implies that I2 ∈ Mod(KB ∔ form(I2, I3)).
Now consider Mod(KB+ form(I1, I2, I3)). Since ∔ satisfies (∔2) and (∔3),
it follows that this is a non-empty subset of {I1, I2, I3}. We claim that
Mod(KB ∔ form(I1, I2, I3))∩{I1, I2} can not be empty. If it is empty, then
it means that Mod(KB ∔ form(I1, I2, I3)) = {I3}. Since ∔ satisfies (∔6)
and (∔7), this further implies that Mod(KB ∔ form(I2, I3)) = Mod(KB ∔
form(I1, I2, I3))∩{I2, I3} = {I3}. This contradicts our observation that I2 ∈
Mod(KB∔form(I2, I3)), and so Mod(KB∔form(I1, I2, I3))∩{I1, I2} can
not be empty. Using (∔6) and (∔7) again, we get Mod(KB∔form(I1, I2)) =
Mod(KB ∔ form(I1, I2, I3))∩{I1, I2}. Since we know that I1 ∈Mod(KB ∔
form(I1, I2)), it follows that I1 ∈ Mod(KB ∔ form(I1, I2, I3)). From (∔6)
and (∔7) we also getMod(KB∔form(I1, I3)) =Mod(KB+form(I1, I2, I3))∩
{I1, I3}, which clearly implies that I1 ∈Mod(KB ∔ form(I1, I3)). From our
definition of ≤KB, we now obtain I1 ≤KB I3. Thus, ≤KB is a pre-order.
(≤ 2) ≤KB is total.
Since ∔ satisfies (∔2) and (∔3), for any two abductive interpretations I and
I ′ in S, it follows that Mod(KB ∔ form(I, I ′)) is a non-empty subset of
{I, I ′}. Hence, ≤KB is total.
(≤ 3) ≤KB is faithful to KB.
From our definition of ≤KB, it follows that ∀I1, I2 ∈Mod(KB) : I1 <KB I2
does not hold. Suppose I1 ∈ Mod(KB) and I2 < Mod(KB). Then, we have
I1 ≤KB I2. Since ∔ satisfies (∔4), we also have Mod(KB ∔ form(I1, I2)) =
{I1}. Thus, from our definition of ≤KB, we can not have I2 ≤KB I1. So, if
I1 ∈ Mod(KB) and I2 < Mod(KB), then I1 <KB I2 holds. Thus, ≤KB is
faithful to KB.
(≤ 4) For any non-empty subset F of S, Min(F ,≤KB) is not empty.
Let α be a sentence such that Mod({α} ∪ IC) = F . We have already shown
that Mod(KB ∔ α) =Min(F ,≤KB). Since, ∔ satisfies (∔3), it follows that
Mod(KB ∔ α) is not empty, and thus Min(F ,≤KB) is not empty.
(≤ 5) If KB ≡ KB′, then ≤KB=≤KB′.
This follows immediately from the fact that ∔ satisfies (∔5).
Thus, the order among interpretations ≤KB, constructed as per our defini-
tion, satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5), and Mod(KB ∔α) =Min(Mod({α}∪ IC),≤KB).

So, we have a one to one correspondence between the axiomatization and the
construction, which is highly desirable, and this is summarized by the following
representation theorem.
Theorem 1. Let KB be revised by α, and KB ∔ α be obtained by the con-
struction discussed above. Then, ∔ is a revision operator iff it satisfies all the
rationality postulates (∔1) to (∔7).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 1. and Lemma 2. 
3.3 Contraction
Contraction of a sentence from a Horn knowledge base KB is studied in the
same way as that of revision. We first discuss the rationality of change during
contraction and proceed to provide a construction for contraction using duality
between revision and contraction.
Rationality Postulates
Let KB =< P,Ab, IC,K > be contracted by a sentence α to result in a new
Horn knowledge base KB−˙α =< P ′, Ab′, IC′,K ′ >.
(−˙1) (Inferential Constancy)P ′ = P and Ab′ = Ab and IC′ = IC.
(−˙2) (Success)If α < CnP (KB), then α is not accepted in KB−˙α, i.e. if α is not
true in all the abductive interpretations, then α is not true in all abductive
interpretations in Mod(KB−˙α).
(−˙3) (Inclusion)∀ (belief) β:if β is accepted in KB−˙α, then β is accepted in KB,
i.e. Mod(KB) ⊆Mod(KB−˙α).
(−˙4) (Vacuity)If α is not accepted in KB, then KB−˙α = KB, i.e. if α is not true
in all the abductive models of KB, then Mod(KB−˙α) =Mod(KB).
(−˙5) (Recovery)(KB−˙α)+α impliesKB, i.e.Mod(KB−˙α)∩Mod(α) ⊆Mod(KB).
(−˙6) (Preservation)If KB ≡ KB′ and α ≡ β, then KB−˙α = KB′−˙β, i.e. if
Mod(KB) = Mod(KB′) and Mod(α) = Mod(β), then Mod(KB−˙α) =
Mod(KB′−˙β).
(−˙7) (Conjunction 1) KB−˙(α ∧ β) implies KB−˙α∩KB−˙β, i.e. Mod(KB−˙(α ∧
β)) ⊆Mod(KB−˙α) ∪Mod(KB−˙β).
(−˙8) (Conjunction 2)If α is not accepted in KB−˙(α ∧ β), then KB−˙α implies
KB−˙(α ∧ β), i.e. if α is not true in all the models of KB−˙(α ∧ β), then
Mod(KB−˙α) ⊆Mod(KB−˙(α ∧ β)).
Before providing a construction for contraction, we wish to study the duality
between revision and contraction. The Levi and Harper identities still holds in
our case, and is discussed in the sequel.
Relationship between contraction and revision
Contraction and revision are related to each other. Given a contraction func-
tion −˙, a revision function ∔ can be obtained as follows:
(Levi Identity) Mod(KB ∔ α) =Mod(KB−˙¬α) ∩Mod(α)
The following theorem formally states that Levi identity holds in our approach.
Theorem 2. Let −˙ be a contraction operator that satisfies all the rationality
postulates (−˙1) to (−˙8). Then, the revision function ∔, obtained from −˙ using
the Levi Identity, satisfies all the rationality postulates (∔1) to (∔7). .
Similarly, a contraction function −˙ can be constructed using the given revi-
sion function ∔ as follows:
(Harper Identity) Mod(KB−˙α) =Mod(KB) ∪Mod(KB ∔ ¬α)
Theorem 3. Let ∔ be a revision operator that satisfies all the rationality pos-
tulates (∔1) to (∔7). Then, the contraction function −˙, obtained from ∔ using
the Harper Identity, satisfies all the rationality postulates (−˙1) to (−˙8). 
Construction
Given the construction for revision, based on order among interpretation in
S, a construction for contraction can be provided as:
Mod(KB−˙α) =Mod(KB) ∪Min(Mod({¬α} ∪ IC),≤KB),
where ≤KB is the relation among interpretations in S that satisfies the ratio-
nality axioms (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). As in the case of revision, this construction says
what should be the models of the resulting Horn knowledge base, and does not
explicitly say what the resulting Horn knowledge base is.
Representation theorem
Since the construction for contraction is based on a rational contraction for
revision, the following lemmae and theorem follow obviously.
Lemma 3. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base, ≤KB an order among S that
satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). Let a contraction operator −˙ be defined as: for any
sentence α, Mod(KB−˙α) = Mod(KB) ∪Min(Mod({¬α} ∪ IC),≤KB). Then
−˙ satisfies all the rationality postulates for contraction (−˙1) to (−˙8).
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 3. .
Lemma 4. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base and −˙ a contraction operator that
satisfies all the rationality postulates for contraction (−˙1) to (−˙8). Then, there
exists an order ≤KB among S, that satisfies(≤ 1) to (≤ 5), and for any sentence
α, Mod(KB−˙α) is given as Mod(KB) ∪Min(Mod({¬α} ∪ IC),≤KB).
Proof. Follows from Theorem 1 and Theorem 3.
Theorem 4. Let KB be contracted by α, and KB−˙α be obtained by the con-
struction discussed above. Then −˙ is a contraction operator iff it satisfies all the
rationality postulates (−˙1) to (−˙8).
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. 
4 Relationship with the coherence approach of AGM
Given Horn knowledge base KB =< P,Ab, IC,K > represents a belief set KB•
that is closed under CnP . We have defined howKB can be expanded, revised, or
contracted. The question now is: does our foundational approach (wrt classical
first-order logic) on KB coincide with coherence approach (wrt our consequence
operator CnP ) of AGM on KB
•? There is a problem in answering this ques-
tion (similar practical problem [5]) , since our approach, we require IC to be
immutable, and only the current knowledge K is allowed to change. On the
contrary, AGM approach treat every sentence in KB• equally, and can throw
out sentences from CnP (IC). One way to solve this problem is to assume that
sentences in CnP (IC) are more entrenched than others. However, one-to-one
correspondence can be established, when IC is empty. The key is our conse-
quence operator CnP , and in the following, we show that coherence approach
of AGM with this consequence operator, is exactly same as our foundational
approach, when IC is empty.
4.1 Expansion
Expansion in AGM (see [1])- framework is defined as KB#α = CnP (KB
• ∪
{α}), is is easy to see that this is equivalent to our definition of expansion (when
IC is empty), and is formalized below.
Theorem 5. Let KB + α be an expansion of KB by α (as defined in section
3.2). Then (KB + α)• = KB#α.
Proof. By our definition of expansion, (KB+α)• = CnP (IC ∪K ∪{α}), which
is clearly the same set as CnP (KB
• ∪ {α}). 
4.2 Revision
AGM puts forward rationality postulates (∗1) to (∗8) to be satisfied by a revision
operator on KB•. reproduced below:
(*1) (Closure) KB• ∗ α is a belief set.
(*2) (Success) α ∈ KB• ∗ α.
(*3) (Expansion 1) KB• ∗ α ⊆ KB•#α.
(*4) (Expansion 2) If ¬α < KB•, then KB•#α ⊆ KB• ∗ α.
(*5) (Consistency)KB• ∗ α is inconsistent iff ⊢ ¬α.
(*6) (Preservation) If ⊢ α↔ β, then KB• ∗ α = KB• ∗ β.
(*7) (Conjunction 1) KB• ∗ (α ∧ β) ⊆ (KB• ∗ α)#β.
(*8) (Conjunction 2) If ¬β < KB• ∗ α, then,(KB• ∗ α)#β ⊆ KB• ∗ (α ∧ β).
The equivalence between our approach and AGM approach is brought out
by the following two theorems.
Theorem 6. Let KB a Horn knowledge base with an empty IC and ∔ be a
revision function that satisfies all the rationality postulates (∔1) to (∔7). Let
a revision operator ∗ on KB• be defined as: for any sentence α, KB• ∗ α =
(KB∔α)•. The revision operator *, thus defined satisfies all the AGM -postulates
for revision (∗1) to (∗8).
Proof.
(*1) KB• ∗ α is a belief set.
This follows immediately, because (KB ∔ α)• is closed wrt CnP .
(*2) α ∈ KB• ∗ α.
This follows from the fact that ∔ satisfies (∔2).
(*3) KB• ∗ α ⊆ KB•#α.
(*4) If ¬α < KB•, then KB•#α ⊆ KB• ∗ α.
These two postulates follow from (∔4) and theorem 5.
(*5) KB• ∗ α is inconsistent iff ⊢ ¬α.
This follows from from (∔3) and our assumption that IC is empty.
(*6) If ⊢ α↔ β, then KB• ∗ α = KB• ∗ β.
This corresponds to (∔5).
(*7) KB• ∗ (α ∧ β) ⊆ (KB• ∗ α)#β. This follows from (∔6) and theorem 5.
(*8) If ¬β < KB• ∗ α, then,(KB• ∗ α)#β ⊆ KB• ∗ (α ∧ β).
This follows from (∔7) and theorem 5. 
Theorem 7. Let KB a Horn knowledge base with an empty IC and * a revi-
sion operator that satisfies all the AGM -postulates (∗1) to (∗8). Let a revision
function + on KB be defined as: for any sentence α, (KB ∔ α)• = KB• ∗ α.
The revision function +, thus defined, satisfies all the rationality postulates (∔1)
to (∔7).
Proof.
(∔1) P,Ab and IC do not change.
Obvious.
(∔2) α is accepted in KB ∔ α.
Follows from (∗2).
(∔3) If α is satisfiable and consistent with IC, then KB ∔ α is consistent.
Since we have assumed IC to be empty, this directly corresponds to (∗5).
(∔4) If ¬α is not accepted in KB, then KB ∔ α ≡ KB + α.
Follows from (∗3) and (∗4).
(+5) If KB ≡ KB′ and α ≡ β, then KB ∔ α ≡ KB′ ∔ β.
Since KB ≡ KB′ they represent same belief set, i.e. KB• = KB′•. Now,
this postulate follows immediately from (∗6).
(∔6) (KB ∔ α) + β implies KB ∔ (α ∧ β).
Corresponds to (∗7).
(∔7) If ¬β is not accepted in KB ∔ α, then KB ∔ (α ∧ β) implies (KB ∔ α) + β.
Corresponds to (∗8). 
4.3 Contraction
AGM puts forward rationality postulates (−1) to (−8) to be satisfied by a
contraction operator on closed set KB•, reproduced below:
(−1) (Closure) KB• − α is a belief set.
(−2) (Inclusion) KB• − α ⊆ KB•.
(−3) (Vacuity) If α < KB•, then KB• − α = KB•.
(−4) (Success) If 0 α, then α < KB• − α.
(−5) (Preservation) If ⊢ α↔ β, then KB• − α = KB• − β.
(−6) (Recovery) KB• ⊂ (KB• − α) + α.
(−7) (Conjunction 1)KB• − α ∩KB• − β ⊆ KB• − (α ∧ β).
(−8) (Conjunction 2) If α < KB• − (α ∧ β), then KB• − (α ∧ β) ⊆ KB• − α.
As in the case of revision, the equivalence is brought out by the following
theorems. Since contraction is constructed in terms of revision, these theorems
are trivial.
Theorem 8. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base with an empty IC and −˙ be a
contraction function that satisfies all the rationality postulates (−˙1) to (−˙8). Let
a contraction operator − on KB• be defined as: for any sentence α, KB•−α =
(KB−˙α)•. The contraction operator −, thus defined, satisfies all the AGM -
postulates for contraction (−1) to (−8).
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem 6. 
Theorem 9. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base with an empty IC and − be a
contraction operator that satisfies all the AGM - postulates (−1) to (−8). Let a
contraction function −˙ on KB be defined as: for any sentence α, (KB−˙α)• =
KB• − α. The contraction function −˙, thus defined, satisfies all the rationality
postulates (−˙1) to (−˙8).
Proof. Follows from Theorem 3 and Theorem 7. 
5 Realizing Horn knowledge base dynamics using
abductive explanations
In this section, we explore how belief dynamics can be realized in practice (see
[7,10,11]). Here, we will see how revision can be implemented based on the con-
struction using models of revising sentence and an order among them. The notion
of abduction proves to be useful and is explained in the sequel.
Let α be a sentence in L. An abductive explanation for α wrt KB is a set
of abductive literals 2 ∆ s.t. ∆ consistent with IC and ∆ |=P α (that is α ∈
CnP (∆)). Further ∆ is said to be minimal iff no proper subset of ∆ is an
abductive explanation for α.
The basic idea to implement revision of a Horn knowledge base KB by a
sentence α, is to realize Mod({α} ∪ IC) in terms of abductive explanations for
α wrt KB. We first provide a useful lemma.
Definition 4. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base, α a sentence, and ∆1 and
∆2 be two minimal abductive explanations for α wrt KB. Then, the disjunction
of ∆1 and ∆2, written as ∆1 ∨∆2, is given as:
∆1 ∨∆2 = (∆1 ∩∆2) ∪ {α ∨ β|α ∈ ∆1\∆2 and β ∈ ∆2\∆1}.
Extending this to ∆•, a set of minimal abductive explanations for α wrt KB,
∨∆• is given by the disjunction of all elements of ∆•.
Lemma 5. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base, α a sentence,and ∆1 and ∆2
be two minimal abductive explanations for α wrt KB. Then,Mod(∆1 ∨ ∆2) =
Mod(∆1) ∪Mod(∆2).
Proof. First we show that every model of ∆1 is a model of ∆1 ∨∆2. Clearly, a
model M of ∆1 satisfies all the sentences in (∆1 ∩∆2). The other sentences in
(∆1 ∨∆2) are of the form α ∨ β, where α is from ∆1 and β is from ∆2. Since
M is a model of ∆1, α is true in M , and hence all such sentences are satisfied
by M . Hence M is a model of ∆1∨∆2 too. Similarly, it can be shown that every
model of ∆2 is a model of ∆1 ∨∆2 too.
Now, it remains to be shown that every model M of ∆1∨∆2 is either a model
of ∆1 or a model of ∆2. We will now show that if M is not a model of ∆2, then
2 An abductive literal is either an abducible A from Ab, or its negation ¬A.
it must be a model of ∆1. Since M satisfies all the sentences in (∆1 ∩∆2), we
need only to show that M also satisfies all the sentences in ∆1\∆2. For every
element α ∈ ∆1\∆2: there exists a subset of (∆1 ∨ ∆2), {α ∨ β|β ∈ ∆2\∆2}.
M satisfies all the sentences in this subset. Suppose M does not satisfy α, then
it must satisfy all β ∈ ∆1\∆2. This implies that M is a model of ∆2, which is
a contradictory to our assumption. Hence M must satisfy α, and thus a model
∆1. Similarly, it can be shown that M must be a model of ∆2 if it is not a model
of ∆1. 
As one would expect, all the models of revising sentence α can be realized
in terms abductive explanations for α, and the relationship is precisely stated
below.
Lemma 6. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base, α a sentence, and ∆• the set
of all minimal abductive explanations for α wrt KB. Then Mod({α} ∪ IC) =
Mod(∨∆•).
Proof. It can be easily verified that every model M of a minimal abductive expla-
nation is also a model of α. Since every minimal abductive explanation satisfies
IC, M is a model of α ∪ IC. It remains to be shown that every model M of
{α}∪IC is a model of one of the minimal abductive explanations for α wrt KB.
This can be verified by observing that a minimal abductive explanation for α wrt
KB can be obtained from M . 
Thus, we have a way to generate all the models of {α}∪IC, and we just need
to select a subset of this based on an order that satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). Suppose
we have such an order that satisfies all the required postulates, then this order
can be mapped to a particular set of abductive explanations for α wrt KB. This
is stated precisely in the following theorem. An important implication of this
theorem is that there is no need to compute all the abductive explanations for
α wrt KB. However, it does not say which abductive explanations need to be
computed.
Theorem 10. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base, and ≤KB be an order among
abductive interpretations in S that satisfies all the rationality axioms (≤ 1) to
(≤ 5). Then, for every sentence α, there exists ∆• a set of minimal abduc-
tive explanations for α wrt KB, s.t. Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB) is a subset of
Mod(∨∆•), and this does not hold for any proper subset of ∆•.
Proof. From Lemma 6. and Lemma 5., it is clear that Mod({α} ∪ IC) is the
union of all the models of all minimal abductive explanations of α wrt KB.
Min selects a subset of this, and the theorem follows immediately. .
The above theorem 10. is still not very useful in realizing revision. We need to
have an order among all the interpretations that satisfies all the required axioms,
and need to compute all the abductive explanations for α wrt KB. The need
to compute all abductive explanations arises from the fact that the converse of
the above theorem does not hold in general. This scheme requires an universal
order ≤, in the sense that same order can be used for any Horn knowledge base.
Otherwise, it would be necessary to specify the new order to be used for further
modifying (KB ∔ α). However, even if the order can be worked out, it is not
desirable to demand all abductive explanations of α wrt KB be computed. So,
it is desirable to work out, when the converse of the above theorem is true. The
following theorem says that, suppose α is rejected in KB, then revision of KB
by α can be worked out in terms of some abductive explanations for α wrt KB.
Theorem 11. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base, and a revision function ∔
be defined as: for any sentence α that is rejected in KB, Mod(KB ∔ α) is a
non-empty subset of Mod(∨∆•), where ∆• is a set of all minimal abductive
explanations for α wrt KB. Then, there exists an order ≤KB among abductive
interpretations in S, s.t. ≤KB satisfies all the rationality axioms (≤ 1) to (≤ 5)
and Mod(KB ∔ α) =Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB).
Proof. It is easy to define a pre-order s.t. every model ofMod(KB∔α) is strictly
minimal than all other interpretations. It is easy to verify that such a pre-order
satisfies (≤ 1) to (≤ 5). In particular, since α is rejected in KB, (≤ 3) faithful-
ness is satisfied, and since non-empty subset of Mod(∨∆•) is selected, (≤ 4) is
also satisfied. 
An important corollary of this theorem is that, revision of KB by α can
be realized just by computing one abductive explanation of α wrt KB, and is
stated below.
Corollary 1. Let KB be a Horn knowledge base, and a revision function ∔
be defined as: for any sentence α that is rejected in KB, Mod(KB ∔ α) is a
non-empty subset of Mod(∆), where ∆ is an abductive explanations for α wrt
KB. Then, there exists an order ≤KB among abductive interpretations in S, s.t.
≤KB satisfies all the rationality axioms (≤ 1) to (≤ 5) and Mod(KB ∔ α) =
Min(Mod({α} ∪ IC),≤KB). 
The precondition that α is rejected in KB is not a serious limitation in
various applications such as database updates and diagnosis, where close world
assumption is employed to infer negative information. For example, in diagnosis
it is generally assumed that all components are functioning normally, unless
otherwise there is specific information against it. Hence, a Horn knowledge base
in diagnosis either accepts or rejects normality of a component, and there is
no ”don’t know” third state. In other words, in these applications the Horn
knowledge base is assumed to be complete. Hence, when such a complete Horn
knowledge base is revised by α, either α is already accepted in KB or rejected
in KB, and so the above scheme works fine.
6 Related Works
We begin by recalling previous work on view deletion. Chandrabose [10,11],
defines a contraction operator in view deletion with respect to a set of formulae
or sentences using Hansson’s [20] belief change. Similar to our [14] approach, he
focused on set of formulae or sentences in Horn knowledge base revision for view
update wrt. insertion and deletion and formulae are considered at the same level.
Chandrabose proposed different ways to change Horn knowledge base via only
database deletion, devising particular postulate which is shown to be necessary
and sufficient for such an update process.
Our Horn knowledge base consists of two parts, immutable part and updat-
able part , but focus is on principle of minimal change. There are more related
works on that topic. Eiter [17] is focusing on revision from different perspec-
tive - prime implication. Segerberg [48] defined new modeling for belief revision
in terms of irrevocability on prioritized revision. Hansson [20] constructed five
types of non-prioritized belief revision. Makinson [31] developed dialogue form of
revision AGM. Papini[39] defined a new version of Horn knowledge base revision.
We are bridging gap between philosophical work, paying little attention to
computational aspects of database work [32,49]. In such a case, Hansson’s[20]
kernel change is related with abductive method. Aliseda’s [2] book on abductive
reasoning is one of the motivation keys. Christiansen’s [12,13] work on dynam-
ics of abductive logic grammars exactly fits our minimal change (insertion and
deletion).
In general, our abduction theory is related to Horn knowledge base dynamics
(see how abduction theory is related with other applications, respectively, reason-
ing [6,41,42], update[44,45], equivalence[22,42,43] and problem solving[23,30]).
More similar to our work is paper presented by Bessant et al. [7], local search-
based heuristic technique that empirically proves to be often viable, even in the
context of very large propositional applications. Laurent et al.[26] parented up-
dating deductive databases in which every insertion or deletion of a fact can be
performed in a deterministic way.
Furthermore, and at a first sight more related to our work, some work has
been done on ”core-retainment” (same as our immutable part) in the model of
language splitting introduced by Parikh [37]. More recently, Doukari [16], O¨zc¸ep
[36] and Wu, et al. [51] applied similar ideas for dealing with knowledge base
dynamics. These works represent motivation keys for our future work. Second, we
are dealing with how to change minimally in the theory of ”principle of minimal
change”, but current focuss is on finding second best abductive explanation [27]
and 2-valued minimal hypothesis for each normal program [40]. Finally, when
we presented Horn knowledge base change in abduction framework, we did not
talk about compilability and complexity (see the works of Liberatore [28] and
Zanuttini [52]).
7 Conclusion
The main contribution of this work lies in showing how abductive framework
deals with Horn knowledge base dynamics via belief change operation. We con-
sider the immutable part as defining a new logical system. By a logical system,
we mean that it defines its own consequence relation and closure operator. We
presented that relationship of the coherence approach of AGM with this con-
sequence operator is exactly same as our foundational approach, when IC is
empty.
We believe that Horn knowledge base dynamics can also be applied to other
applications such as view maintenance, diagnosis, and we plan to explore it in
further works [9]. Still, a lot of developments are possible, for improving existing
operators or for defining new classes of change operators. As immediate exten-
sion, question raises: is there any real life application for AGM in 25 year theory?
[18]. The revision and update are more challenging in Horn knowledge base dy-
namic, so we can extend the theory to combine results similar to Konieczny’s
[24] and Nayak’s [34].
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